Family Law Case Updates – January 2025 – Stephens & Stevens Marital & Family Law

Agreements:

Duran v. Duran, 403 So.3d 1039 (Fla. 3^rd DCA 2025). Order declining to enforce prenuptial agreement affirmed when supported by competent evidence. Judge Oscar Rodriguez Fonts affirmed.

Alimony:

Smith v. Chevillet, 403 So.3d 230 (Fla. 4^th DCA 2025). Trial court erred awarding rehabilitative alimony when record had no evidence to support award. Discussion between attorney for one party and judge was not an agreement without the unequivocal assent of the other party. Fact court failed to make required findings was waived by party’s failure to seek rehearing. Judge Darren Shull reversed.

Woodward v. Woodward, 400 So. 3d 861 (Fla. 2^nd DCA 2025). Trial court entered final judgment in February 2023. Permanent alimony was eliminated by legislation for any case initiated or pending as of July 1, 2023. Because this case was appealed, the matter was still pending as of July 1, 2023, so permanent alimony is not an option even though final judgment originally entered in February 2023. On remand, court needs to consider ability, adultery and whether a supportive relationship exists. Judge Lindsey M. Alvarez affirmed in part, reversed in part.

Annulment:

Rojas v. Londono, 404 So.3d 579 (Fla. 3^rd DCA 2025). Trial court affirmed for denying annulment when record demonstrated marriage was consummated and wife did not enter marriage fraudulently. Judge Christina Marie DiRaimondo affirmed.

Child Support:

Smith v. Chevillet, 403 So.3d 230 (Fla. 4^th DCA 2025). Trial court failed to add alimony received to recipient’s income for purposes of calculating child support. Judge Darren Shull reversed.

Equitable Distribution:

Bell v. Bell, 401 So.3d 592 (Fla. 5^th DCA 2025). Trial court erred by failing to credit husband $10,009 loan he paid on Wife’s vehicle. Judge James E. Kallaher affirmed in part, reversed in part.

Cancel v. Cancel, 399 So.3d 371 (Fla. 2^nd DCA 2024). Trial court erred failing to distribute marital portion of husband’s retirement that was not yet in pay status, because of no evidence of the value. Court could have used “deferred distribution” method by assuming amount of benefit if husband had retired at time of trial without early retirement penalty, and multiplying it by percentage other spouse is entitled to. Judge Brian Gnage affirmed in part, reversed in part.

Kerrigan v. Page, 401 So.3d 569 (Fla. 2^nd DCA 2024). Trial court erred failing to address mortgage paydown of premarital property made with marital funds. Judge Brian Gnage affirmed in part, reversed in part.
Michener v. Michener, 403 So.3d 1040 (Fla. 3^rd DCA 2025). Trial court erred unequally distributing parties’ retirement accounts by over $250,000, because wife destroyed husband’s Star Wars collection (and other memorabilia) that he listed on his financial affidavit was worth $14,500, but he testified that certain items were priceless because they could not be replaced. A sentimental interest of property by one party cannot takeover financial fairness to other party. Judge Spencer Multack affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Exclusive Use and Possession:

Campana v. Trabold, 403 So.3d 333 (Fla. 2^nd DCA 2024). Trial court erred granting “no-contact” order which effectively gave Father exclusive use and possession of jointly-owned residence when it was not plead, not noticed, nor tried by consent. Judge Nancy L. Jacobs reversed.

Injunctions:

Abercrombie v. Nenneman, 401 So.3d 614 (Fla. 2^nd DCA 2025). Trial court erred entering stalking injunction when ex-girlfriend 1) called and texted ex-boyfriend several times, 2) appeared at his work several times, 3) followed him after a court hearing crying in a parking lot, because this would not constitute substantial distress to a reasonable person as required. Judge Linda H. Babb reversed.

Name Change:

In Re: M.T.F., 401 So.3d 367 (Fla. 4^th DCA 2025). Trial court affirmed for denying name change of minor child, when petition failed to describe how it was in child’s best interest. Trial court reversed for denying motion for rehearing which did. Judge Karen M. Miller affirmed in part, reversed in part.

Parenting:

Rosado v. Samuelsen, 401 So.3d 606 (Fla. 5^th DCA 2025). Trial court made oral pronouncement that it would include a provision in parenting plan that child must be administered prescribed. Such final judgment was reversed when it failed to include this provision. Judge Brian J. Welke affirmed in part, reversed in part.

Paternity:

Bronner v. Longden, 398 So.3d 1015 (Fla. 4^th DCA 2024). Trial court erred making findings of fact without an evidentiary hearing and dismissing potential legal father’s paternity action when allegations in petition should have been taken as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. Matter remanded for evidentiary hearing to determine if acknowledgement of paternity should be voided due to fraud, duress, or mistake of fact. Judge Darren Shull reversed.

Schauer v. Mitchell, 401 So.3d 627 (Fla. 1^st DA 2025). Trial court’s non-final order affirmed, finding father’s paternity had been established and denying pick-up order because amended F.S. §744.301(1) now establishes paternity when father is on birth certificate and Mom signed voluntary acknowledgment of paternity at child’s birth. Judge Frederick Laurence Koberlein, Jr. affirmed.

Procedure:

Bonsignori v. Boulay, 402 So.3d 434 (Fla. 2^nd DCA 2024). Trial court affirmed for denying 12.540(b)(5) “new circumstances” motion when facts do not amount to new circumstances occurring post-judgment. Judge Steve D. Berlin affirmed.

Oria v. Velastegui, 402 So.3d 427 (Fla. 3^rd DCA 2024). Trial court erred dismissing a modification seeking to adjudicate issues that were not addressed in original paternity judgment because in this case, the Mother defaulted and because of that, the Court had to assume father’s allegation of substantial change of circumstances was deemed admitted. Court affirmed for dismissing request for holiday timesharing as that had been addressed in the final judgment. Judge Marcia Del Ray affirmed in part, reversed in part.

Pardes v. Pardes, 404 So.3d 543 (Fla. 3^rd DCA 2025). Writ of prohibition granted to prevent circuit court judge from determining amount of attorney’s fees already awarded, when parties agreed all litigation will be adjudicated by a private judge.

Phinney v. Phinney, 50 Fla.L.Weekly D207 (Fla. 3^rd DCA 2025). Husband’s sister was his guardian after traumatic head injury, and also his attorney in his divorce. Trial court erred disqualifying the sister/guardian/attorney as the attorney for the husband, when sister/guardian/attorney was going to be a witness at final hearing. Disqualifying sister/guardian/attorney was too broad. Sister/guardian/attorney should only be prohibited from being attorney at hearing she would be a witness. Judge Marlene Fernandez-Karavetsos reversed.

3 responses to “Family Law Case Updates – January 2025”

Carrie Turner

May 12, 2025 at 7:30 am

👍🏻👍🏻👍🏻

Reply
Richard Peraza

October 2, 2025 at 3:08 am
Request for Factual Correction – Pardes v. Pardes

Dear Eddie Stephens,

I am contacting you regarding the article on Pardes v. Pardes. https://eddiestephens.com/2025/02/11/family-law-case-updates-january-2025/ The article incorrectly refers to Judge Stanford Blake as having the authority of a voluntary trial resolution judge and presiding over the trial.

The facts are:
1. Judge retired Stanford Blake did not have a referral order as a voluntary trial resolution judge.
2. He did not have written consent from both parties to act beyond pre-trial matters.
3. The referral explicitly limited him to pre-trial matters only, and he was instructed not to make any decisions or conduct trials.
4. He was required to report back to the court once pre-trial duties were completed.
5. Additionally, retired Judge Stanford Blake has repeatedly issued rulings outside the scope of his referral over the past ten years, resulting in substantial personal and financial damages to the personal representative of the estate, with ongoing effects for nearly twelve years.
Please correct the article to reflect these accurate facts. The current version misrepresents the procedural reality of the case and omits the long-term consequences of unauthorized rulings.

Thank you for your prompt attention.

See attached Referal Order
Reply
1. Eddie Stephens
  
  October 21, 2025 at 3:15 pm
  
  Taking Mr. Peraza’s issues in turn:
  
  1. Your summary incorrectly refers to the private judge as having the authority of a voluntary trial resolution judge and presiding over the trial.
  
  a. Response: The decision states clearly that the private judge had the authority of a voluntary trial resolution judge
  
  i. “[The Parties] petition this court to prohibit the trial court from acting outside its authority in a matter referred to a trial resolution judge (commonly known as a private judge) for resolution of various matters pursuant to section 44.104, Florida Statute.”
  
  ii. “The parties consented to Judge Blake’s authority to resolve all litigation between the parties. Even without a specific reservation by the private judge to determine the amount of fees, such reservation is assumed in the issuance of the order of entitlement to fees.”
  
  2. Judge retired Stanford Blake did not have a referral order as a voluntary trial resolution judge.
  
  a. Response: Whether or not there was a referral order was not an issue to the 3rd DCA. The parties consented to the private judge, and that was enough for the 3rd DCA to. I view this similarly to an arbitration clause; the court does not have to issue a referral order to an arbitrator when the parties have agreed to it. The statute agrees:
  
  i. “Two or more opposing parties who are involved in a civil dispute may agree in writing to submit the controversy to voluntary binding arbitration, or voluntary trial resolution, in lieu of litigation of the issues involved, prior to or after a lawsuit has been filed, provided no constitutional issue is involved.” FLA. STAT. 44.104
  
  3. [The Private Judge] did not have written consent from both parties to act beyond pre-trial matters.
  
  a. Response: See answer to #1.
  
  i. “The parties consented to Judge Blake’s authority to resolve all litigation between the parties. Even without a specific reservation by the private judge to determine the amount of fees, such reservation is assumed in the issuance of the order of entitlement to fees.”
  
  4. [The Private Judge] was required to report back to the court once pre-trial duties were completed.
  
  a. Response: This is irrelevant. See answer to #1 and #3.
  
  5. Additionally, [the Private Judge] has repeatedly issued rulings outside the scope of his referral over the past ten years, resulting in substantial personal and financial damages to the personal representative of the estate, with ongoing effects for nearly twelve years.
  
  a. Response: Again, this is irrelevant.
  
  Reply