Eddie Stephens – Family Law

Baranowski v. Tesh and the Emerging District Divide Over Lump-Sum Alimony

Baranowski v. Tesh, — So. 3d —-, 2026 WL 2104335, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1465 (Fla. 2d DCA July 22, 2026).

The Second District has now said, in plain terms, that a trial court awarding lump-sum alimony doesn’t have to make a separate finding of “special circumstances,” “unusual circumstances,” or “special necessity.”

If you practice in the Fourth District, don’t pull those words out of your proposed final judgment yet. The answer to this one still depends on which DCA you’re standing in.

WHAT HAPPENED

Twenty-six-year marriage. One minor child. The trial court awarded the Former Wife six years of durational alimony and ordered it paid in a single lump sum. The Former Husband didn’t challenge durational alimony itself—he challenged the *form* of payment, arguing that converting a durational award into an immediately vested lump sum stripped him of the modification and termination protections that durational alimony is supposed to carry under section 61.14.

He also argued the trial court needed to find “unusual circumstances” to justify it, and he had real ammunition: Coltea v. Coltea, 856 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Rosario v. Rosario, 945 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); and Greene v. Greene, 895 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).

The Second District’s answer: no.

Section 61.08 imposes no such requirement. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980), controls, and the question is simply whether the lump-sum award—considering the general equities—accomplishes “equity and justice between the parties.” The current statute backs this up: section 61.08 expressly allows periodic or lump-sum payments, and expressly allows a combination of both.

On the facts, the court leaned on its own 1999 decision in Borchard v. Borchard, 730 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), where lump-sum alimony helped a spouse “transition to being a single mom.” Here, the Former Wife had scaled back her career so the Former Husband could build his—he made roughly double her income by the time of trial—and the trial court found the lump-sum award appropriate to close that gap. No magic words required.

So, at least in the Second DCA, “special circumstances” are no longer the price of admission.

THE FOURTH DCA HAS A DIFFERENT RULE

The Second District can’t recede from Coltea—it’s not their case to recede from. One district doesn’t overrule another.

And the Fourth District’s line of cases says something meaningfully different. In Coltea, decided en banc, the court approved lump-sum alimony to secure support where the husband had a documented history of refusing to support his family—an example of the kind of extraordinary circumstance that justifies the remedy. *Rosario* made the rule explicit: lump-sum support used as support requires a “special necessity” and “unusual circumstances” that go above and beyond what would support ordinary periodic alimony. Taylor v. Taylor, 114 So. 3d 283 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), doubled down, quoting Rosario directly.

That’s hard to square with Baranowski‘s flat statement that “the statute imposes no requirement that the trial court make a finding of ‘unusual circumstances’ or ‘special necessity’ in awarding lump sum alimony.”

There’s your issue.

SO WHICH RULE APPLIES?

Know your DCA.

Under Baranowski, the Second District’s framework starts and ends with the statute and Canakaris: determine need and ability to pay, run through the statutory factors, explain why this form of payment is equitable, and confirm the obligor can pay the lump sum without substantially endangering their economic status. No separate “special circumstances” showing required.

The Fourth District cases layer something extra on top: where ordinary periodic support would otherwise do the job, there has to be something more—a documented refusal to pay, a genuine need to secure future payments, some circumstance justifying an immediately vested, nonmodifiable obligation.

A lawyer litigating this in Pasco County has *Baranowski*. A lawyer litigating the identical issue in Palm Beach County still has Coltea, Rosario, and Taylor staring back at them—and Baranowski didn’t touch any of the three.

ONE MORE WRINKLE

The Fourth District trilogy was decided under earlier versions of section 61.08. Baranowski interprets the substantially revised, post-2023 statute (ch. 2023-315, Laws of Fla.), which now expressly authorizes lump-sum payments and combinations of payment forms.

Would the Fourth District still require “special circumstances” under the current statute, or would it follow Baranowski‘s reasoning that the legislature simply didn’t impose one? Nobody knows yet. Until the Fourth District weighs in, I wouldn’t volunteer a client’s appellate issue to find out.

THE SAFE PRACTICE

Second District: Build findings on need, ability to pay, the section 61.08(2) factors, why lump-sum payment is equitable, and why the obligor can pay it without endangering their economic status. That’s the Baranowski/Canakaris framework, full stop.

Fourth District: Do all of the above, then keep going. Plead and prove the traditional “special necessity/unusual circumstances” test on top of it. Explain specifically why periodic support won’t work. Identify the circumstance requiring the extra protection of a lump-sum award. Get written findings on it.

Maybe Baranowski eventually convinces the Fourth District that Rosario and Taylor didn’t survive the 2023 amendments. Maybe it doesn’t. Either way, your client’s final judgment is not the vehicle to find out.

BOARD CERT TIP:

And for anyone planning to sit for the Marital & Family Law Board Certification Examination next year . . .

I might put a little star next to Baranowski v. Tesh.

Just saying.